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Abstract
Traditional theories of capital structure do not explain the puzzling phenomena of
zero-leverage firms and negative net debt ratios. We develop a theory where firms
adopt a net debt target that acts as a balancing variable between equityholders
and managers. Negative (positive) net debt occurs in human (physical) capital
intensive industries. Negative net debt arises because tradeable claims cannot
be issued against transferable human capital. Heterogeneity in capital structure
occurs when firms have debt that is not fully collateralized. Physical capital
intensive firms take on high leverage but may underlever to avoid bankruptcy
costs. This creates excess rents for managers (even if the supply of human capital
is competitive) because wealth constraints prevent managers from co-investing.
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Although there is an extensive literature in corporate finance on theories of capital
structure, these theories typically remain silent about cash and its effect on leverage.
For example, if a company borrows more money and keeps the proceeds as cash within
the firm then this transaction unambiguously raises the firm’s debt and leverage. How-
ever, the firm can subsequently reverse the transaction by using the cash to pay off the
debt. As such the firm’s net debt and net leverage have not changed, which may ex-
plain why standard valuation models subtract the amount of cash in the firm’s balance
sheet from the value of outstanding debt in order to determine the firm’s leverage.
Rather surprisingly, the terms “net debt” and “net leverage” barely feature in the
finance literature and little significance has been attached to these measures. There
are theories of debt, and theories of cash (or liquidity) but very few papers analyze
how both are jointly determined.1
Why should we have a theory of net debt? First, as mentioned before, a theory of
net debt formally recognizes that cash is (to a high degree at least) negative debt and
may therefore be a part of the capital structure decision rather than an asset that is
exogenously given. Second, by netting out liquid assets against debt liabilities the net
debt ratio (NDR) is no longer bounded by zero but can vary from -1 to +1. The NDR
contains therefore more information than the traditional leverage ratio, which is left-
censored at zero. A theory of net debt may resolve the “mystery of zero-leverage firms”,
because all zero leverage firms are simply firms with a negative NDR.2 Zero-leverage
is therefore no longer an extreme polar case.3
1The few contributions that simultaneously analyze financing and cash holding decisions include
Hennessy and Whited (2005), Acharya et al. (2007) and Gamba and Triantis (2008).
2Strebulaev and Yang (2006) provide empirical evidence of the widespread and persistent phe-
nomenon of zero-leverage firms and argue that existing capital structure theories struggle to explain
the puzzle.
3Standard capital structure theories do not model net debt or net leverage. This is immediately
apparent from the fact that firms without debt are all categorized as zero leverage firms, whether they
have cash or not. Of course, the amount of cash (or liquid assets more generally) may influence, among
others, the tax shield, expected bankruptcy or agency costs, and the degree of information asymmetry
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Third, a theory of net debt opens the door for an integrated theory of debt and
cash. While our theory of net debt leaves an element of indeterminacy (there are an
infinite number of combinations of debt and cash that lead to the same amount of net
debt), we show in related work that this indeterminacy can be resolved by introducing
additional frictions.4 Fourth, a theory of net debt may help explaining some puzzling
trends. Bates et al. (2009) report that the average (median) NDR for US firms has
fallen from 16.5% (17.8%) in 1980 to -1.5% (-0.3%) in 2004. The negative trend is
pretty much monotonic over time. The current widespread occurrence of “negative net
debt” implies that the majority of firms would be capable of redeeming all debt with
the cash they have available. This raises the obvious question as to why so many firms
have negative debt and what their common characteristics are.
As existing capital structure theories cannot predict negative leverage (the optimal
leverage range is the [0, 1] interval), we need a new ingredient that can generate nega-
tive net leverage targets. This crucial ingredient is non-tradeable, transferable human
capital. Its choice is not by accident but motivated by important economic consider-
ations. First, the relative importance of human capital in the economy has increased
over time. The rise of the high-tech, bio-tech, health, media, services and knowledge
based industries has shifted the emphasis towards human capital, away from physical
capital. Second, the amount of money and time that individuals invest in their human
capital in terms of education and training has increased a lot in recent decades. Ag-
but that is a different matter because in those theories cash enters as an exogenous variable, whereas
in our model cash enters as an endogenous variable. (Berk et al. (2010) allow for negative debt and
interpret it as cash. A key difference with our paper is that debt in their model is issued due to the
associated tax shield.)
4A simple, somewhat trivial example would be to assume that the interest on cash is less than the
interest on debt. In that case the firm will not hold any cash (debt) if net debt is positive (negative).
Therefore, this simple friction unambiguously pins down the amount of cash and debt once the net
debt target is known. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2007) show that cash is not identical to negative debt
if firms have profitable future investment opportunities but face limited access to external funding.
Anticipating these constraints firms prefer saving cash (reducing debt) if the correlation between cash
flows and investment opportunities is low (high). In our model cash is negative debt because firms do
not have future investment opportunities.
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gregating employees’ investment in transferable (i.e. non-firm specific) human capital
within a firm can lead to non-trivial amounts, especially in sectors such as health care,
biotech and financial services. Third, human capital has become much more transfer-
able and mobile. Human capital is much less tied to a particular firm and has, in a
globalized world, also become more mobile in a geographical sense.
Many firms now consider human capital as their most important “asset”. Yet,
human capital is not recorded as an asset on the firm’s balance sheet.5 Furthermore,
providers of human capital are through their personal investment in human capital
(often paid for by personal loans) indirectly financing firms. “Knowledge workers” are
therefore rightly considered to be the new capitalists (The Economist, 2001). However,
while they clearly have a stake in the firm, they do not feature in the firm’s liabilities,
unlike bond- and equityholders.6 The crucial difference between human and physical
capital is that the former is not tradeable. Therefore, unlike physical capital, no
tradeable claims can be issued against transferable human capital. The mobility of
human capital across firms and industries makes it difficult even to assign human
capital to one specific firm. Human capital has in many way blurred the boundaries
of the firm. Zingales (2000) argues that “the nature of the firm is changing”, that
“human capital is emerging as the most crucial asset”, and that “existing corporate
finance theories seem to be quite ineffective in helping us cope with the new type of
firm that is emerging”. The case of the British advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi,
described in Rajan and Zingales (2000) provides a stark illustration of the issues raised.7
Given the special nature of human capital, in what way would one expect the capital
structure and asset structure of human capital intensive firms to differ from firms that
are more heavily based on physical capital? How does an industry’s human capital
intensity affect equilibrium profit rates, dividend payout and managerial compensa-
tion? What inefficiencies arise if ownership of human capital and physical capital are
5One exception are certain types of sport clubs that buy and sell players.
6Even if the providers of human capital are given shares in the firm, their claim remains clearly
different from outside equity investors’.
7After their generous compensation package was voted down by shareholders, the chairman and
several senior executives of Saatchi and Saatchi left the firm and started a rival firm that in a short
time captured a substantial part of the business of the original firm.
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separated? This paper presents a theory that addresses these questions.
It is fairly well understood that scarcity of, say, managerial talent creates space
for managerial rents and results in underinvestment. We focus therefore on the more
interesting question whether managers or equityholders can capture excess rents when
the supply of equity capital and human capital are perfectly competitive. Our model
focuses on the effect of three important frictions: 1) managerial wealth constraints,
2) non-tradeable human capital and 3) corporate bankruptcy costs. We abstract from
information asymmetry as well as from taxes, which are not needed in our model to
generate positive debt levels (unlike Jaggia and Thakor (1994) and Berk et al. (2010)).
Furthermore, we analyze the effects of asset tangibility and economic uncertainty on
the level of debt, wages and industry output.
We consider firms that need both physical capital and human capital. The former
is financed by equityholders and bondholders, whereas managers make the investment
in human capital. Both types of capital have separate owners because of managerial
wealth constraints. Importantly, human capital is transferable across firms within the
industry. While the firm is operational, equityholders and managers bargain about
free cash flows (i.e. profits after interest repayment). Some firms leave the industry in
recession because equityholders and managers choose to exercise their outside option.
Equityholders liquidate the physical capital, whereas managers take up their reserva-
tion wage outside the industry. Managers have the option to subsequently return when
the industry recovers. The value of managers’ outside option is therefore determined
not only by the outside reservation wage, but also by the value of the embedded option
to return to the industry.
With separation of equity and human capital, net debt acts as a “balancing” vari-
able. Higher debt levels benefit equityholders because for every dollar of debt raised,
equityholders need to contribute one dollar less of their own money, while at the same
time the constraining effect of increased interest repayments is shared with managers.
A higher debt level obviously harms managers as it reduces the free cash flows to be
shared. In an industry where human and equity capital are supplied competitively,
the equilibrium debt level ensures that the supply of human capital and equity capital
match each other. The resulting net debt level decreases (increases) with the cost of
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investment in human (physical) capital and can become negative for human capital in-
tensive industries. Negative debt creates the mirror effect of standard debt: for every
extra dollar of negative debt, equityholders in effect put up a full dollar worth of high
yield liquid assets, but they only capture a fraction of the interest that these assets
subsequently generate.
Why can a negative net debt target arise? Whereas the firm owns physical capital,
it has no property rights over human capital that can leave the firm at any time.
Therefore the firm cannot issue tradeable claims like debt or equity directly against
transferable human capital. It is this asymmetry between human capital and physical
capital that can lead to a negative net debt target. Managers only invest in human
capital if they expect to get a fair return ex post. In human capital intensive industries
equityholders therefore contribute a net surplus of cash (i.e. negative net debt) that
generate rents to be shared with managers.
Competition ensures that the efficient industry output level is achieved for as long
as the optimal net debt level remains below the firm’s liquidation value (i.e. the
debt is fully secured). In this case both equityholders and managers get the efficient
compensation rate in booms and recessions. Inefficiencies arise when the firm requires a
lot of physical capital and relatively little human capital. In that case firms would like to
put in place a high debt level that is not fully secured by the firm’s assets in liquidation
in order to reduce free cash flows. However, risky debt brings with it two sources
of inefficiency: the standard Myers (1977) debt overhang problem and deadweight
bankruptcy costs. These two costs deteriorate the terms at which equityholders can
raise debt financing for the firm. As a result, firms may decide instead to cap the debt
level to the value of the firm in liquidation, so as to keep the debt safe. The cost of
“under-leverage” is that managers can extract more than their fair share of rents, which
leads to underinvestment in booms. If the investment in human capital is sufficiently
large then the cost of under-leverage is smaller than the costs associated with risky
debt. If, however, managers contribute very little human capital then the cost of under-
leverage is larger than the cost associated with risky debt, and firms therefore adopt
a debt level that exceeds the liquidation value of the firm. Even though all firms are
ex ante identical, under-collateralized debt introduces heterogeneity in firms’ capital
structure. Some firms (i.e. the second movers into the industry) adopt a higher debt
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principal, have a higher market leverage and default in recession. Other firms (i.e.
the first movers) adopt a lower debt level, survive in recession and therefore avoid
bankruptcy costs. The tradeoff between bankruptcy costs and managerial rent capture
induces heterogeneity in capital structure in a similar fashion as in Maksimovic and
Zechner (1991), where firms trade off the tax advantage of debt against the agency
costs of debt.
Managers of underlevered firms capture excess rents in booms. These excess rents
can be partially clawed back in recession when managers of underlevered firms accept
a salary rate that is below their outside reservation wage. These managers are willing
to stick with the firm in recession, because by doing so they enjoy again excess rents
once the economy reverts to a boom.
What are the frictions that allow managers to capture excess rents in a competi-
tive labor market? It is the combination of bankruptcy costs and managerial wealth
constraints. Bankruptcy costs alone are not sufficient because in a competitive labor
market unconstrained managers would compete away all excess rents by co-investing
in physical capital upon joining the firm. Since managers’ claim cannot be traded it is
neither possible for an investor to co-invest on managers’ behalf. The result has impor-
tant implications. For example, excessive compensation in the banking sector is often
attributed to the scarce supply of human talent. While scarcity may be a contributing
factor, our result shows that the owners of transferable human capital can capture
excess rents in highly levered industries even when labor markets are competitive.
We review below a number of papers that have studied the link between capital
structure and human capital. In general, they do not focus on net leverage and, as
such, do not explain why some firms adopt a negative net debt target. In fact, there is
no role for cash in these models (Berk et al. (2010) is a notable exception). Another
crucial difference is that we consider transferable human capital. Existing papers either
explicitly assume human capital to be relation-specific (or entrenched) or simply remain
silent about outside opportunities for managerial human capital. Either way, human
capital is tied to the firm, which finds it optimal to issue some debt. We show that as
a firm relies increasingly on transferable human capital, its net debt position becomes
negative and its equity claim is increasingly backed by cash on the firm’s balance sheet.
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In the limiting case where only transferable human capital is required (and no physical
capital), we could end up with a cash-only firm that is all-equity financed resulting in
an NDR of -1. On the other hand, a firm where managers contribute no human capital
whatsoever could be 100% debt financed with an NDR of 1. Unlike existing papers we
also endogenize the value of equityholders’ and managers’ outside options and explain
how outside options affect payout, managerial compensation and capital structure.
Hart and Moore (1994) consider an entrepreneur who needs to raise finance from
an investor, but cannot commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project.
They show that the threat of repudiation means that some profitable projects will not
be financed (see also Baldwin (1983) with monopolistic supply of labor). This type
of underinvestment does not occur in our model because the availability of profitable
projects would induce more individuals to invest in human capital and offer their
services. The transferable nature of human capital in our model is a double-edged sword
for managers: while it allows managers to withdraw and transfer their human capital
elsewhere, it also means that other people can be called in to fill their seat. Competition
between managers therefore restores efficiency in our model, but insufficient entry in
booms can result from anticipated bankruptcy costs and managerial wealth constraints.
A number of related papers show how debt provides a bargaining advantage to equi-
tyholders when bargaining with workers (e.g., Baldwin, 1983; Perotti and Spier, 1993;
Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993) or when negotiating with a supplier (e.g., Hennessy and
Livdan, 2009). In none of these models, negative leverage arises as a result.8
Jaggia and Thakor (1994) study the link between capital structure and investment
in firm-specific human capital (or relation-specific capital, more generally). High lever-
age increases the likelihood of firms going bankrupt and employees losing their job.
High leverage may therefore undermine employees’ incentives and propensity to invest
in firm-specific human capital, resulting in a loss of efficiency that can be traded off
against a debt tax shield. Our model does not require taxes, and managers cannot be
held up ex-post because human capital is transferable in our model.9 Crucially, since
8For a detailed discussion of implicit contracts and the related literature, we refer to Hennessy and
Livdan (2009).
9Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) present persuasive empirical evidence that the increase in manage-
rial compensation over the period 1970-2000 can be explained by an increase in the importance of
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firm-specific capital is tied to the firm, it does by itself not lead to a negative net debt
target. In other words, there is no explicit role for cash in Jaggia and Thakor (1994).
Firm-specific human capital is subject to a severe hold-up problem, and enforceable
contracts may be required to protect employees. Not surprisingly, Jaggia and Thakor
(1994) adopt a contractual approach. In contrast, our equilibrium sharing rule be-
tween equityholders and managers is supported by a self-enforcing “implicit contract”
in which debt acts as a balancing variable.
The idea that capital structure can affect implicit contracts was put forward by
Titman (1984) who showed that appropriate selection of capital structure assures that
incentives between the firm and its stakeholders (such as workers, customers and sup-
pliers) are aligned so that the firm implements the ex-ante value maximizing liquidation
policy.
Berk et al. (2010) develop a dynamic continuous-time model that explores the
link between human capital and capital structure within an economy with competitive
capital and labor. They identify the negative effect of bankruptcy on the welfare of
entrenched workers as the key component of indirect bankruptcy costs. As a result, they
are able to explain empirically observed low debt ratios, as well as their heterogeneity,
with an employee risk aversion. To compensate risk-averse workers for a higher risk of
bankruptcy, more highly levered firms offer higher compensation. (In our model higher
rents do not result from risk aversion but from the combination of bankruptcy costs
and managerial wealth constraints.) Under the assumption that capital is less risky
than labor, more labor-intensive firms should have lower leverage.
Some papers consider mechanisms other than capital structure to induce relation-
specific investment such as ownership (Hart and Moore, 1990), regulation of access to
critical resources (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), dispersed ownership structure (Burkart
et al., 1997) and (weak) governance (Acharya et al., 2010).
While our model assumes symmetric information and does not consider issuance
costs, a large number of papers explain capital structure and cash holdings on the
basis of signalling costs, or issuance costs for debt and equity more generally. Myers
and Majluf (1984) argue that firms should stock up on liquid assets to finance in-
transferable skills (as opposed to firm-specific knowledge) in managing the modern corporation.
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vestment opportunities with internal funds because of information asymmetry induced
financing constraints. In particular, they show that lemons premia associated with ex-
ternal equity create incentives to use retained earnings and debt as sources of funds.10
In Viswanath (1993) a firm may be better off issuing equity in the first period and
conserving slack for the second period, depending on the nature of the information
asymmetry expected in the two periods.
Kim et al. (1998) model the firm’s decision to invest in liquid assets when external
financing is costly. The optimal amount of liquidity is determined by a tradeoff between
the low return earned on liquid assets and the benefit of minimizing the need for costly
external financing.
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) argue that internal resource allocation gives a firm a
real option to avoid external capital markets (and the associated deadweight transac-
tion costs) in more states of the world than single-business firms. This benefit has to
be traded off against the overinvestment agency problem that internal resource flex-
ibility creates. Inderst and Mu¨ller (2003) adopt an optimal contracting approach to
examine the role of headquarters for financing constraints, thus tying together internal
and external capital markets.
Hennessy et al. (2007) develop a Q theory of investment under financing constraints.
The firm invests and saves optimally facing convex costs of external equity, overhang
from outstanding debt, and collateral constraints on new borrowing. In Hennessy et
al. (2010) the privately informed controlling insider-shareholder has an endogenous
precautionary motive to hoard cash in order to avoid future signaling costs. In equilib-
rium, firms with negative private information have negative leverage and issue equity.
Firms signal positive information by substituting debt for equity. Finally, Gryglewicz
(2011) models a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends,
and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity
shocks.
10An earlier paper by Ross (1977) shows that managers with an informational advantage have an
incentive to signal their private information through their choice of debt level. Firms with lower
expected cash flows find it more costly (because of bankruptcy costs) to incur higher levels of debt
than firms with higher expected cash flows.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model in its
most basic, static form. It shows that the paper’s key results require only two key
assumptions: transferable human capital and managerial wealth constraints. It allows
the reader to appreciate how the results are affected by the subsequent introduction
of uncertainty, bankruptcy costs and outside options in sections 3 and 4. Section 3
derives the first-best investment policy in a dynamic, competitive industry where firms
are run by owner-managers. Section 4 analyzes the optimal investment policy with
separation of equity capital and human capital. We derive closed form solutions for
the optimal debt policy, payout policy and managerial compensation, and we discuss
efficiency implications. Sections 5 and 6 present the paper’s empirical implications and
conclusions, respectively.
2 The Static Model
Consider an industry populated with atomistic firms that each produce a flow of one
infinitesimal unit of output in continuous time. Let Q denote the total mass of industry
output.11 Each firm’s profit rate is given by pi(Q). In this section pi(Q) is static in
perpetuity. All agents are risk neutral. The risk-free rate of interest is denoted by r.
Firms need both physical capital and human capital to be operational. Investment
in physical capital costs a fixed, exogenous amount I (per infinitesimal unit of output,
and therefore per firm). I includes investment in tangible assets such as plant and
equipment, as well as intangible investment expenditure such as marketing. Each firm
has one manager who has to invest a fixed, exogenous amount H in human capital.12
The cost H can be thought of as investment in time, education, training, knowledge,
networking and experience necessary for running the firm. Importantly, this invest-
ment, while sunk, only needs to be made once. In other words, should a manager leave
the firm and join another firm within the industry, then there is no need for her to incur
the investment in human capital again. Human capital is therefore perfectly transfer-
11For a more detailed description of how atomistic firms are modeled in a dynamic, competitive
industry, see Leahy (1993), among others.
12The manager is, in practice, a metaphor for a team of managers.
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able in our model. Managers who do not get hired can fall back on their opportunity
wage rate w outside the industry.
Assume first a frictionless Modigliani and Miller (M&M) environment. Conse-
quently, the firm value V = pi(Q)
r
is independent of the amount of outstanding debt D,
making capital structure irrelevant. Let us assume next that managers cannot provide
the physical capital because of wealth constraints. The physical capital is financed by
(perpetual) debt and equity. This forces the ownership of human capital and physical
capital to be separated. Assume that equityholders’ and managers’ claim are, respec-
tively, given by E = η(V − D) and M = (1 − η)(V − D), where the sharing rule
η ∈ [0, 1] is determined by the parties’ relative bargaining power and where D denotes
the outstanding debt principal. Debt is a senior claim on the firm’s assets.
Investing in physical capital and in human capital is a positive investment for
equityholders and managers, respectively, if and only if:








If the overall NPV of the investment is positive (i.e. V ≥ I + H + w
r
) then a debt
level that is acceptable to both parties always exists. A higher debt level unambigu-
ously benefits equityholders and hurts managers. A sufficiently high level of human
capital H forces the net debt level to become negative. Negative net debt means that
equityholders not only finance the physical assets, but on top contribute a (net) cash
surplus equal to −D. This cash is added to the firm’s assets so that the firm’s total
net asset base to be shared between both parties is now increased to V − D (> V ).
Existing capital structure theories take assets (and cash in particular) as given and
then determine how optimally to finance these assets. Our theory says that corporate
cashholdings can be endogenous to the capital structure decision. This result follows
directly from the non tradeable and fleeting nature of human capital. In the absence
of property rights on human capital, managers cannot be tied to a single firm. As a
result the firm cannot finance the investment in human capital by issuing tradeable
claims against it. This explains why managers bear the cost of transferable human
capital and why firms need cash to attract and retain human capital.
So far, our theory merely provides a range of feasible debt levels. To pin down a
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unique debt level we need to introduce additional assumptions. One could, for example,
assume that physical capital is very limited in supply (e.g. a unique piece of land, a
patent or a licence) but that human capital is abundant. In that case equityholders
would set D at the highest possible level that still satisfies managers’ participation
constraint. Analogously, if human capital is scarce relative to the supply of equity
capital then competition between equity providers may result in the lowest debt level at
which equityholders break even, creating space for managerial rents. Limited supply of
physical or human capital may also lead to insufficient entry (“underinvestment”) into
the industry. The effects of restrictions on the supply side are fairly well understood,
and we therefore adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The supply of equity capital and human capital is competitive.
The assumption implies (in the absence of any other frictions) that E = I − D and
M = H + w
r
. In other words, equityholders and managers just break even and receive
a competitive rate of return on their investment. Solving this system of break-even
conditions pins down the firm’s operating value (V ) and net debt value (D) in industry
equilibrium:
V = I + H +
w
r










Assume that pi′(Q) < 0, pi(0) = ∞ and pi(∞) ≤ 0. These conditions ensure that at
all times there is a unique, strictly positive level of industry output Q which is the
solution to pi(Q) = rV . The competitive managerial compensation rate is given by
s = rM = r(1 − η)(V −D). Using the solutions for V and D results in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 In a static environment the debt (D) target, firm profits (pi) and man-
agerial compensation rate (s) are given by:










pi(Q) = r (I +H) + w (3)
s = w + r H (4)
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Managers and equityholders receive the competitive return on their investment. The
efficient industry output level (from a welfare viewpoint) is achieved.
The proposition implies that the net debt target is positively related to the investment
in physical capital I and negatively related to the investment in human capital H
(cf. Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; Berk et al., 2010). Debt level also decreases with
equityholders’ bargaining power η (cf. Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993). Unlike in
Hennessy and Livdan (2009), zero debt is not a polar case and occurs for η being
strictly smaller than 1.
While we assume throughout the paper that all investment in physical and human
capital happens upfront, this is not strictly necessary. Suppose, for example, that an
unanticipated positive industry development allows all firms to expand provided that
they invest an extra ∆I and ∆H in physical and human capital, respectively. Under
perfect competition, we get that the change in the firm’s operating value and net debt






If only investment in physical capital is required (i.e. ∆H = 0) then the additional
investment is fully debt financed, i.e. ∆D = ∆I. The financing policy of firms that
invest primarily in physical capital therefore resembles a strict pecking order policy.
If, however, only investment in human capital is required (i.e. ∆I = 0) then the firm





∆H = −∆D. Firms that need to
attract transferable human capital therefore issue equity.13
Debt does not need to be fixed once and for all. If circumstances change in favor of
managers (equityholders) then the debt level would have to be reduced (raised) in order
to keep both parties on board. The results in Proposition 1 therefore do not rely on
any form of pre-commitment. It is important to stress that the results in Proposition
1 (and all future propositions) neither depend on whether equityholders or managers
set debt.
Proposition 1 implies that the firm’s total assets, equity value and managerial claim
value increase with the absolute amount invested in human capital. This is not sur-
13Note that an industry shock that does not involve additional investments (i.e. ∆H = ∆I = 0)
does not result in net debt changes (i.e. ∆D = 0). Instead, a positive (negative) industry shock is
absorbed by industry entry (exit). We treat this case in detail in next sections.
13
prising. A more interesting question is to see how these entities change with human





. Note that i + h = 1 by construction. Let us next standardize the firm’s claim
values by defining E˜ ≡ E
V
, D˜ ≡ D
V
, M˜ ≡ M
V
and V˜ ≡ V
V
= 1. This allows us to
express firms’ market value balance sheet as a function of physical capital intensity i
(0 ≤ i ≤ 1).
Firms with positive net debt (D ≥ 0) Firms with negative net debt (D < 0)
V˜ = 1 D˜ = i−η











(1− i) −D˜ = η−i
1−η M˜ = 1− i
M˜ = 1− i ——– ——–
V˜ − D˜ = 1−i
1−η E˜ + M˜ =
1−i
1−η
Net debt is positive (negative) if i ≥ η (i ≤ η). In other words negative net debt arises
if equityholders’ contribution in terms of physical capital falls short of their relative
bargaining power. The net debt level addresses this imbalance by forcing equityholders
to contribute cash in order to increase the pie to be shared between managers and
equityholders.
The firm’s equity market capitalization decreases (increases) with the degree of
physical (human) capital intensity. Interestingly, while the total (scaled) market value
of the assets is constant and given by V˜ = 1 for firms with positive net debt, the value
of total assets V˜ −D˜ = 1−i
1−η exceeds 1 and decreases (increases) with physical (human)
capital intensity when net debt is negative. This means that, all else equal, human
capital intensive firms have “larger” balance sheets than physical capital intensive firms
as a result of accumulated cash.
In the limiting case where the firm is 100% human capital intensive (i.e. i = 0) we
obtain E˜ = −D˜ = η
1−η and M˜ = V˜ . The firm appears like a cash-only firm where
the cash has been all-equity financed. The other polar case where the firm is 100%
physical capital intensive (i.e. i = 1) results in a firm that is 100% debt financed (i.e.
V˜ = D˜ and E˜ = M˜ = 0). Since managers make zero investment in human capital,
only 100% debt financing prevents them from getting a free lunch.
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1− i if D ≤ 0 (6)
The NDR unambiguously falls with equityholders’ bargaining power η. A higher η
allows equityholders to extract a higher fraction of free cash flows ex post, and therefore
equityholders must contribute more funds ex ante to compensate.
Given that i ∈ [0, 1] it follows that NDR ∈ [−η, 1] with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. In contrast,
traditional leverage measures based on debt (rather than net debt) fall within the
[0, 1] interval and lump all firms with negative net debt together in the zero leverage
category. This left-censoring leads to a substantial loss of information and may explain
the widespread occurrence of zero-leverage firms.
In summary, our theory of net debt is based on two key assumptions: 1) managers
are wealth constrained, leading to a separation between owners and managers and 2)
human capital is transferable. The results seem to suggest that the efficient outcome
should prevail even with separation between equityholders and managers. This outcome
depends, however, on all other M&M assumptions being satisfied. As such, our bare-
bone theory of capital structure ignores two frictions that have shown to be important
determinants of debt targets, namely taxes and bankruptcy costs. We ignore taxes in
this paper because it turns out that taxes do not add any new insights. Instead we
focus on bankruptcy costs in conjunction with economic uncertainty. The potential
closure of firms in a recession raises interesting new questions regarding the role of
equityholders’ and managers’ outside options when the firm is broken up and how
these options affect industry output, corporate payout and managerial compensation
over the business cycle. In what follows sections 3 and 4 introduce uncertainty and
outside options into the model. Section 3 derives the optimal decision rules for the
14Our NDR definition adjusts leverage for the presence of inside equity, and is similar to the one
adopted by Lambrecht and Myers (2008). The definition implies that debt is a prior claim to man-
agers’. A more traditional leverage definition such as DE+D (instead of our
D
D+E+M ) implicitly assumes
that managers’ claim is senior to debt and treats payments to human capital as operating costs. In
other words, traditional capital structure models assume that operating profits pi (and therefore V )
are measured net of wages, i.e. V = D + E (instead of V = D + E +M).
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owner-manager case whereas section 4 considers the case where equity capital and
human capital are separated.
3 The Dynamic Model with Owner-Managers
At any moment in continuous time the industry can be in one of the following two
states: boom or recession. When the industry is in the boom (recession), recession
(boom) arrives according to a Poisson process with parameter λ (λ). Each firm’s
profits in booms and recessions are given by pi(Q) and pi(Q), respectively, where Q
(Q) denotes the industry output in booms (recessions). For a given industry output
level Q, firms enjoy higher profits in booms than in recessions, i.e. pi(Q) > pi(Q).
Furthermore, firm profits are decreasing in the total industry output (pi′(Q) < 0 and
pi′(Q) < 0). For analytical convenience, we assume that pi(0) = pi(0) =∞, pi(∞) ≤ 0,
pi(∞) ≤ 0 and that ∀Q : pi′(Q) < pi′(Q). These conditions ensure that at all times
there is a unique, strictly positive level of output.
The stock of physical capital can at any time be liquidated for a constant amount
L, should the firm wish to leave the industry. In order to rule out the existence of a
money machine we assume that I ≥ L. I − L represents the intangible component
of the investment (e.g. marketing expenses). The manager’s opportunity wage rate
outside the industry is w and w during booms and recessions, respectively.15 The basic
model framework is summarized in Figure 1.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here.]
15To avoid a perverse situation where managers want to enter in recession and leave in booms, we
make the reasonable assumption that managers’ reservation wage is higher in booms than in recessions
(i.e. w ≥ w).
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3.1 SOME BUILDING BLOCKS FOR VALUING CLAIMS
Before we solve for the owner-managers’ investment policy in industry equilibrium,
we introduce the following proposition that provides the main building blocks for our
future valuation problems (proofs are given in the appendix).
Proposition 2 (a) The value of a claim that pays 1 dollar the first time when the






(b) The value of a claim that pays a cash-flow rate pi (pi) for as long as the current





(c) The value of a perpetual claim that pays a cash flow pi during booms and pi during
recessions equals:
V s(Q,Q) ≡ pi(Q)r (1− p) +
pi(Q)
r
p when currently in a boom
V s(Q,Q) ≡ pi(Q)r (1− p) + pi(Q)r p when currently in a recession
(7)
where p ≡ λ
r+λ+λ
and p ≡ λ
r+λ+λ
The valuation formulas for V s and V s have simple, intuitive interpretations. For ex-





, where the former (latter)
perpetuity denotes the present value of receiving the cash flow pi (pi) forever.16 The
weights are given by (1− p) and p, where 0 ≤ p = λ
r+λ+λ
≤ 1. If the likelihood of a




the hazard of switching from a boom to a recession becomes extremely large compared




3.2 FIRST-BEST INVESTMENT POLICY
We now study entry and exit decisions in a competitive industry where each firm is run
by an owner-manager who provides both the required physical capital (I) and human
16We drop the argument of pi (pi) if doing so does not introduce ambiguity.
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capital (H). This benchmark case assumes that managers are not wealth constrained.
Consequently, debt has no role to play.
The opportunity cost to each investor of not investing in human capital is the
opportunity wage rate that could be earned outside the industry. Should a potential
owner-manager decide never to invest then statement (c) in Proposition 2 implies that




(1− p) + w
r
p and W =
w
r
(1− p) + w
r
p
Consider next an owner-manager who operates in the industry during booms, but
leaves the industry during recessions. This type of owner-manager incurs a one-off
investment cost H in human capital. She pays I at the start of each boom and receives
cash flows at a rate pi during each boom. She also receives the liquidation value L at
the start of each recession and her opportunity wage rate w during recessions. Finally,
an owner-manager who operates in the industry during booms and recessions incurs a
one-off investment cost H and I at the start of the first boom, and receives cash flows
pi (in booms) and pi (in recessions) thereafter.
We focus in this paper on the case in which some firms leave in recession.17 We
therefore impose the following condition throughout the paper (the derivation of this
condition is given in the proof of Proposition 3):
Assumption 2 Demand shocks are sufficiently high such that some firms leave in
recession, i.e.:
pi(Q˜) − pi(Q˜) > (I − L) (r + λ + λ) + w + r H
1− p − w (8)
where Q˜ is the solution to V s(Q˜, Q˜) = I +H +W .
How big demand shocks have to be depends on the other model parameters, such
as the sunk cost of investment in human (H) and physical (I − L) capital. Higher
sunk costs discourage exit and therefore need to be accompanied by relatively higher
17The treatment of the case for which no firms leave in recession is available from the authors upon
request.
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demand shocks for exit to occur. One can show, for example, that there exists a critical
threshold H˜ such that exit occurs for H < H˜ and no exit occurs for H ≥ H˜ (holding
all else constant). One can prove (see appendix) the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The first-best industry output in booms (Q) and recessions (Q) are the
solution to the following equations:
pi(Q) =
[




= charge for physical capital + charge for human capital
pi(Q) = [r L − λ (I − L)] + w ≡ pio(L) (10)
= charge for physical capital + charge for human capital
The value of survivors and leavers in respectively booms and recessions are:
V s(Q,Q) = V l(Q,Q) = I + H + W and V s(Q,Q) = L + W + δ H (11)
where the subscripts “l” and “s” refer to firms that leave and survive in recession,
respectively.
The proposition gives simple, intuitive expressions for the equilibrium profit rates
in booms and recessions. The equilibrium profits can be decomposed in a charge
for physical capital and a charge for human capital (the result parallels the scenario
with a competitive labor market in Baldwin (1983)). During booms the charge for
physical capital equals the opportunity cost of the capital invested (r I) plus a risk
premium for the hazard of recession (λ (I − L)). Conversely, during recessions the
charge for physical capital equals the opportunity cost of liquidating the firm (r L)
minus a discount for the hazard of economic recovery.
During booms the charge for human capital consists of the opportunity wage w
plus a charge equal to rH





for the investment in human capital. In
the limiting case where the industry stays in a boom forever (λ = 0), the required
rate of return on H is just the risk-free rate r. If the hazard rate of switching from
a boom to a recession is strictly positive (λ > 0) then the required rate of return
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increases by λ r
r+λ
, which reflects the discounted value of forgoing r H during recession
( r H
r+λ
) times the hazard rate of a recession arriving (λ) when the economy is in a boom.
Since managers that lose their job in recession merely earn the opportunity wage w,
the longer (shorter) recessions (booms) are expected to last, the larger profits have to
be during booms to recover the investment in human capital. Consider the limiting
case where a recession is expected to last forever (λ = 0), once arrived. In that case
human capital becomes useless for those managers that leave the industry, and as a





rate r is simply augmented by λ, where λ can now be interpreted as a risk of ‘ruin’.
Unlike physical capital, human capital cannot be traded. Consequently, it cannot
be liquidated in recession. Instead, it temporarily leaves the industry and returns in
booms. This difference explains the asymmetry in the expressions for the charge for
human and physical capital.
3.3 EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS
Our model assumes that managers incur the investment cost in human capital, H,
only once. It is possible to generalize the model to the case where managers active
in the industry have to incur the cost H at future random arrival times if they wish
to retain their job.18 The need to make additional investment in human capital could
result from drastic changes or innovations within the industry that require managers
to retrain or incur costs of adjustment.
When the industry is in a boom (recession), an additional cost H has to be incurred
according to a Poisson arrival process with parameter γ (γ). Assume that the Poisson
processes for λ, λ, γ and γ are independent.
If γ > 0, then the industry output can take on 3 different values over time, which
we denote by Q, Q and Qˆ. At the start of a boom all managers entering the industry
for the first time pay H and are aware that further investments in human capital may
be required. When subsequently additional investment during a boom is required,
managers are in the same situation as when they initially entered (bear in mind that
18We thank the referee for suggesting this extension.
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the initial investment H is now sunk and irrelevant in managers’ decision making):
they are required to pay H, knowing additional subsequent investments in human
capital may be required. In booms managers will therefore always decide in favor of
making the additional investment H. Of course, the higher the likelihood of subsequent
investments, the fewer managers enter the industry in the first place. Therefore, the
industry output in booms, Q, is inversely related to γ (and γ).
When a recession arrives, firms leave the industry until the marginal firm is indif-
ferent between staying or leaving. The resulting industry output at the start of the
recession is Q (< Q). Managers that remain active in the industry are aware that
future investment in human capital may be required during recession. If an additional
cost H actually needs to be incurred before the economy reverts to a boom, then some
firms leave the industry causing the output to drop to Qˆ (< Q). As a result, industry
exit can be staggered: a first wave of departures occurs at the start of the recession,
and a second wave of closures happens the first time when further investment in human
capital is required during a recession. Note that further investments in human capital
during recession (but after the second closure wave) do not induce any further exit for
the same reason why additional investments in human capital during booms do not
lead to departures.
While conceptually the solutions for Q, Q and Qˆ can be derived analogously as
before, the expressions for the corresponding firm values (V , V and Vˆ ) become much
more elaborate. In the interest of space we do not report them in the paper.19
19The solution simplifies substantially for the special case where γ = 0, because in that case the
output level takes on only two values (Q and Q) as in the paper’s main model. In particular, if
γ > γ = 0 then all solutions reported in section 3 (and in subsequent sections) go through provided
that w is replaced everywhere by w+γH. In other words, the requirement to make further investments
in human capital during booms raises managers’ opportunity cost of capital by γH, which is the hazard
of additional costs being incurred (γ) times the actual cost being incurred (H).
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4 The Dynamic Model with Separation of Equity
and Human Capital
We now introduce separation between ownership of human capital and equity capital.
As was shown in section 2 debt now acts as a balancing variable between equityholders
and managers. The following assumption formalizes the concept of ‘net debt’ and
specifies the priority structure at closure among the firm’s stakeholders:
Assumption 3 The firm’s net debt, D, is defined as the difference between the firm’s
debt liabilities and its liquid assets. The firm pays (receives) a coupon flow r D for
positive (negative) D until the firm is closed.20 If net debt is negative (D < 0) then
equityholders receive upon closure L plus the liquid assets −D (i.e. L−D). If net debt
is positive then bondholders have a first claim (up to D) on the assets L in liquidation,
with equityholders having the entire residual claim (L − D)+. If the firm defaults on
its debt obligations (D > L), then bankruptcy costs amount to φL.
IfD is positive then the firm’s net debt position is equivalent to a standard perpetual
debt contract with coupon rD that is terminated when the firm defaults. We assume
that the debt is secured by the firm’s physical assets, which means that at closure
bondholders receive min{D , L (1− φξ)} (with ξ = 1 if D > L, and ξ = 0 otherwise),
whereas equityholders receive (L − D)+. This payoff follows from the fact that upon
default bondholders liquidate the firm (like equityholders, bondholders are unable to
run the firm as a going concern). Equityholders default on the debt contract if D > L.
Bankruptcy costs associated with default are a fraction φ of the liquidation value L and
reduce bondholders’ payoff. Bankruptcy costs do not represent the difference between
investment cost and the resale value of assets per se but reflect the deadweight cost of
20We have considered the case where the firm invests in cash holdings that generate a return ρ less
than r. The analysis and results are available upon request and have been omitted in the interest
of space. The assumption that cashholdings grow at the risk-free rate is standard in the corporate
finance literature, even in recent papers (see Berk et al., 2010; Lambrecht and Myers, 2011).
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the transfer of ownership from original equityholders to creditors.21
The firm needs both physical capital (owned by shareholders) and human capital
(owned by wealth constrained managers) to be operational.22 No cash flows are gener-
ated while either party abstains. It is this mutual cost of a stalemate that forces both
parties to negotiate an agreement to share the free cash flows.
When economic conditions deteriorate and free cash flows plummet, it may no
longer be optimal for equityholders and managers to stay together within the firm.
Each party can permanently abandon the firm: equityholders can liquidate the physical
assets, whereas managers can resign to receive their outside reservation wage. While
managers cannot liquidate their human capital, they can re-enter the industry at some
future point without having to incur the investment in human capital again. Managers’
option to leave the industry in recession therefore embeds an option to return in booms.
We adopt the standard assumption that the cash flows generated by the firm are
observable but nonverifiable.23 In this paper we therefore do not derive explicit con-
tracts but self-enforcing agreements and remuneration that, at each moment in time,
are the outcome of bargaining between the equityholders and the managers (also known
as ‘implicit contracts’).24
We now need to decide on a bargaining model to determine how free cash flows are
shared between equityholders and managers. The main bargaining models used in the
finance literature are: the Nash (1950) bargaining model and the Rubinstein (1982)
bargaining model (and their variations). In the Rubinstein game the alternative oppor-
21Since bankruptcy imposes deadweight costs on the lenders, this opens the door for strategic debt
service or restructuring post default. This issue has, however, been studied extensively in the literature
(see, e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996; Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997). We therefore do not
include this possibility in the analysis.
22This assumption does not exclude the possibility of managers being awarded shares in the com-
pany. In that case managers would simply maximize a weighted average of their managerial claim
and equity stake.
23See Hart and Moore (1990, 1994), and the large literature that relates to these papers.
24Implicit contracts are quite common. Gillian et al. (2009) find that less than half of the S&P 500
CEOs are employed under explicit agreements (agreements that specify the terms of the employment
relationship) rather than implicit agreements.
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tunity is modeled as an “outside option” where a party must quit the bargaining table
permanently in order to take up the alternative opportunity. For example, the manager
must permanently resign in order to take up a post elsewhere. In the Nash-bargaining
game the alternative opportunity is modeled as a “threat point”. The underlying as-
sumption is that a party can collect its threat point payoffs for as long as a bargaining
agreement has not been reached. For example, the manager takes up a temporary post
elsewhere while bargaining takes place.25
The difference between an outside option and a threat point results in a different
bargaining solution. While in the Nash bargaining solution each party’s share is strictly
increasing in the value of its threat point, in the Rubinstein bargaining solution each
party gets the best (i.e. the maximum) of his outside option and the bargaining share
that he would obtain in the absence of outside options. The outside option thus acts
as a lower bound or “constraint” on the equilibrium share.
Since equityholders’ decision to liquidate and managers’ decision to resign are per-
manent and irreversible we have a two player game between equityholders and managers
where each party has an outside option. The value of this outside option in booms
(recessions) is denoted by oe and om (oe and om) for equityholders and managers, re-
spectively. We focus on the limiting case where the bargaining interval goes to zero
and bargaining can take place continuously. As such, our game is a continuous-time
variation of the Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Binmore et al. (1986) models of bar-
gaining with outside options and risk of breakdown during negotiation.26 Its solution
is a fairly standard result in the bargaining literature and given below.27
25Malcomson (1997) and Chiu and Yang (1999) discuss in detail the differences between the “outside
option principle” and the “threat point principle”.
26Our setting also includes a risk of breakdown during negotiations. If the economy switches regime
during the bargaining interval then each party receives at the end of that interval its claim associated
with the new regime. If the firm survives under the new regime then bargaining (over the new cash-
flow stream) can carry on, but if the firm cannot survive under the new regime then each party receives
the value of its outside option under the new regime.
27A full derivation of the solution is available from the authors upon request. This derivation also
shows how the bargaining parameter η can be endogenized in more general terms. A continuous-time
variation within a deterministic framework can be found in Hart and Moore (1994).
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Result 1 During booms the compensation rate for human capital (s) and the payout
rate to equityholders (d) both equal one half of the free cash flows: s = d = pi−r D
2
.
During recessions the compensation and payout rate are such that equityholders’ and
managers’ outside option exactly bind (i.e. E = oe and M = om).
During booms, equityholders and the providers of human capital each get half
of the profits after interest repayments if net debt is positive (D ≥ 0), or half of
the combined value of operating profits and the interest generated by liquid assets
if net debt is negative (D < 0). This property is valid irrespective of whether any
outside options bind in recession, or whether the debt is risky. This does, however,
not mean that the payout to equityholders and managers in booms is independent of
what happens in recession or of how much each party invests. We show below that the
equilibrium profits pi and the optimal debt level D are very much influenced by the
other model parameters.
In equilibrium, free cash flows are equally shared in booms (i.e. η = 0.5) because
outside options do not bind in booms and both parties are otherwise symmetric (e.g.
they have the same discount rate). Equal sharing is under those circumstances a
standard feature of Rubinstein style bargaining models.28 Importantly, the results
that follow do not depend in any fundamental way on the shares being exactly equal.
As was shown in section 2 our model and its results can easily be generalized to the
case where s = η(pi − rD) and d = (1− η)(pi − rD) with 0 < η < 1.
In recession, each party’s claim value equals exactly its outside option value because
when the economy switches from a boom to a recession firms keep leaving up to the
point where equityholders and managers are indifferent between staying or leaving.29
28More generally, η is a function of each party’s discount rate and the likelihood of negotiations
breaking down due to the arrival of a recession.
29Strictly speaking it is possible that in recession only one party’s outside option binds. This
scenario arises when demand shocks are so small that no firm leaves the market in recession. The
counterparty that still enjoys a surplus then makes sufficient concessions so as to avoid the other party
to jump ship. Assumption 2 rules out the possibility of no exit in recession.
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Proposition 2 and result 1 together imply that the equityholders’ and managers’
claim values are given by:
E = pi− rD
2(r+λ)
+ δE and E = oe
M = pi− rD
2(r+λ)
+ δM and M = om
The above equations determine the equityholders’ and managers’ claim for exogenously
given profit levels, debt principal and outside option values. We now endogenize the
values of these entities. The following proposition states the value of a firm’s outside
options as a function of its debt principal.
Proposition 4 In recessions, the value of equityholders’ outside option (oe) and of
managers’ outside option (om) are given respectively by:




(1− p) + [(r+λ) I −λL(1−φξ)− rD]
r
p
It follows immediately from equityholders’ limited liability that their payoff from
leaving the firm in recession is given by oe = (L−D)+. The value of managers’ outside
option in recession, om, equals the present value of the wage rate w that managers get
when they leave the industry during recession, and the salary rate they receive when
returning to the industry during booms. Note that om depends on the leavers’ debt
level because managers’ option to leave the industry in recession includes an option to
return in booms. Consequently, the debt level that new entrants subsequently adopt
in booms determines managers’ future salary.
Armed with our expressions for oe and om we can now solve for the industry equi-
librium. We first derive the claim value of those firms that, in equilibrium, leave the
market. To do so we need to pin down the following 3 unknowns: pi, sl, and Dl (re-
member that managers leave the industry during recession and therefore sl = w). sl is
determined by the bargaining solution (i) sl =
pi− rDl
2
. Equity capital is supplied com-
petitively, causing equityholders to break even upon investment, i.e. (ii) El = I − Bl,
where B generally denotes the market value of debt. This gives an equilibrium con-
dition for pi. Finally we need to determine the debt principal Dl of firms that leave
the industry. Assuming without loss of generality that equityholders set debt policy
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then they choose the firm’s debt principal Dl (or coupon level rDl) so as to maximize
their payoff at investment, subject to the managers’ participation constraint.30 Or,








subject to M l ≥ W + H (12)
A higher debt level unambiguously lowers managers’ claim because debt reduces free
cash flows and therefore managers’ salary rate sl =
pi−rDl
2
(note that an atomistic
firm cannot influence pi through its debt policy). On the other hand a higher debt
level increases equityholders’ payoff from investment. For every dollar of debt raised,
equityholders have to contribute one dollar less to the investment, but they share the
pain of the subsequent interest repayment with managers (since dl = sl).
If equityholders’ payoff were everywhere monotonically increasing in the debt prin-
cipal then equityholders would raise debt up to the point where managers’ participa-
tion constraint becomes binding and Dl would simply be pinned down by condition
(iii) M l = W + H. We show, however, in the appendix that equityholders’ payoff
El − (I − Bl) is monotonically increasing in Dl, except at Dl = L, where there can
be a discrete downward jump if bankruptcy costs are strictly positive. At Dl = L, a
marginal increase in the debt level leads to a discrete fall in the market value of the
debt, Bl, because of the deadweight cost of bankruptcy. Depending on the value of H,
this leads to 3 possible regimes for the optimal debt level:
(1) For sufficiently high levels of H (i.e. H∗ < H, where H∗ is defined below) Dl is
the solution to (iii) M l = W + H and managers’ participation constraint binds at a
level Dl < L.
(2) For sufficiently low levels of H (i.e. H < H∗∗, where H∗∗ is defined below) Dl is
again the solution to (iii) M l = W + H but the debt level Dl for which managers’
participation constraint binds exceeds L, i.e. Dl > L.
(3) For an intermediate region (i.e. H∗∗ ≤ H ≤ H∗) a risky debt level (D > L)
could be adopted while still ensuring managers’ participation. However, the gain from
constraining managers is wiped out by the deadweight costs of bankruptcy, which re-
duce the proceeds from the debt issue in a discrete fashion. The debt level is therefore
30As will become clear, the solution turns out to be the same irrespective whether equityholders or
managers set the debt level. This point was previously highlighted in the context of the static model.
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restricted to (iii) Dl = L. By constraining debt to the firm’s liquidation value, man-
agers’ participation constraint is no longer binding (i.e. M l > W + H). Only when H
is below H∗∗ does it pay off to issue risky debt and to raise the principal by a discrete
amount over and beyond L.
Why can managers enjoy excess rents (M l > W + H) whereas equityholders
cannot? Managers cannot commit to taking less than sl of the free cash flows. Given
that managers’ claim cannot be traded in financial markets (unlike equity) it is not
possible for investors to compete away excess value. Managers can neither compete
away among themselves the excess value because this would require that they co-invest
an amount equal to the present value of their excess rents when joining the firm. Wealth
constraints prevent managers from doing this.
We now sketch the derivation of the claim values of those firms that do not leave
in recession (“stayers”). To identify the claim values we need to solve for 4 unknowns:
pi, ss, ss and Ds. Competitive exit ensures that firms leave up to the point where both
parties’ outside options are binding in recession (i.e. managers and equityholders are
indifferent between staying or leaving in recession): (i) Es = oe, and (ii) M s = om.
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The bargaining solution for booms implies that (iii) pi− rDs
2
. Finally, (iv) Es = I −Ds
because outside equity is supplied on a competitive basis.32 Conditions (i), (ii) (iii)
and (iv) determine pi, ss, ss and Ds.
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Our analysis assumes that equityholders set the debt level. Would the results be
different if managers were to set the debt level? The answer is no. In equilibrium
equityholders’ participation constraint is always binding in a competitive equity mar-
ket. Equityholders’ claim increases in the debt level. As a result it is not possible for
managers to reduce the debt any further without violating equityholders’ participation
constraint. The same debt level is therefore also constrained optimal from managers’
viewpoint.
31A situation where one of the outside options is not binding cannot be optimal when there is firm
exit in recession. E.g. if Ms > om then managers of firms that are leaving would be better off making
concessions to equityholders to stop them liquidating the firm.
32Note that Bs = Ds because the debt of surviving firms is safe.
33We show in the appendix that managers’ participation constraint is always satisfied.
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In what follows Propositions 5, 6 and 7 state and discuss the industry equilibrium
for different levels H of investment in human capital. The solution naturally splits up
in 3 cases: high (H∗ ≤ H), intermediate (H∗∗ ≤ H < H∗), and low (H < H∗∗) levels
of human capital.
Proposition 5 If firms are highly human capital intensive (i.e. if the investment H in
human capital satisfies H∗ ≤ H) then we observe ‘regime 1’ in which all firms adopt
the same risk-free debt level and some firms leave in recession. The debt, firm profits
and managerial compensation are given by:
D1(L) = D1s(L) = D1l(L) = I +
λ
r
(I − L) − w
r
− H
1− p = L −
(H −H∗)
1− p
pi1(L) = r I + λ (I − L) + w + r H
1− p = pi
o(L)
pi1(L) = r L − λ (I − L) + w = pio(L)
s1s = s1l = w +
r H
1− p and s1s = s1l = w
where H∗ is the solution to:
w +
r H∗





Proposition 5 gives the optimal investment and debt policy when the investment
in human capital H is relatively large (i.e. H∗ < H). We find that all firms adopt
the same safe debt level (i.e. Ds = Dl ≡ Do < L). The optimal debt level has
a very simple interpretation. It is the debt level that sets equityholders’ (leverage
adjusted) payout rate in booms equal to managers’ salary rate, i.e.: d
o ≡ r (I − Do) +
λ (I − L) = w + r H
1−p ≡ so(H). Therefore, unlike in Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993),
safe debt plays a meaningful role. The relation between the level of debt and market
uncertainty, depends on the relative magnitudes of I − L and H. If physical capital
is more irreversible (large I − L), D increases with uncertainty. In the opposite case
(i.e., large H), the relationship between debt and uncertainty is negative (as in Berk et
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al., 2010). Finally, managers (equityholders) receive the efficient salary (payout) rate
at all times.34
The equilibrium is identical to the first-best solution in section 3 where there is no
separation between equityholders and managers. Full efficiency is achieved thanks to
competition and an optimal debt policy that ensures that equityholders and managers
each get a fair return on their investment. If a firm requires more investment in human
capital then, all else equal, the level of debt in equilibrium is lower. For sufficiently high
levels of investment in human capital, net debt gets negative. In particular, negative
debt occurs if the sunk investment in human capital (H) and the opportunity cost
of human capital (w) are sufficiently large compared to the sunk cost (I − L) and
the cost (I) of physical capital. Our result is therefore related to that of Perotti and
Spier (1993). In their paper, underinvestment could be eliminated by issuing a strictly
positive amount of debt. In our model, the optimal choice of leverage leads to efficient
investment as well. Still, this optimal choice may be associated with negative net debt.
The optimal debt level is decreasing in the firm’s liquidation value. This last result
may come as a surprise as it implies that leverage is negatively related to tangibility,
which is inconsistent, for example, with the tradeoff theory of capital structure. Since
debt is overcollateralized (D < L) bankruptcy costs are, however, not an issue. Higher
tangibility means simply that equityholders get more of their capital investment back
upon closure and, as a result, are willing to accept a lower debt level.35 We show
below that this negative relation between tangibility and leverage is reversed when
firms constrain their debt level because of bankruptcy cost considerations.
Before formulating the results for regime 2, we make the following assumption:
34Managerial salary is an increasing function of uncertainty. This result is different from Berk et
al. (2010), where the contracted wage decreases with cashflow volatility.
35Non-monotonicity of leverage in the firm’s asset tangibility (specificity) and a possible negative
sign for the relation is obtained by Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993). In our framework, this relation
is monotonic within each of the regimes. Moreover, in Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) lower asset
tangibility (i.e., their higher specificity) increases the advantage of debt as a bargaining tool. In our
model, lower asset tangibility increases the level of debt needed to ensure that equityholders earn a
fair rate of return on their investment.
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Assumption 4 Bankruptcy costs are not excessively high, that is, φ < φ∗, where φ∗
is the root to: pi−1
[




Now, we are ready to describe the solution for regime 2, which prevails for inter-
mediate levels of human capital (i.e. H ∈ [H∗∗, H∗[).
Proposition 6 If the investment H in human capital satisfies H∗∗ ≤ H < H∗ then
we observe ‘regime 2’ in which all firms adopt the same risk-free debt level L and some
firms leave in recession. The debt, firm profits and managerial compensation are given
by:
D2(L) = D2s(L) = D2l(L) = L




(I − L) > pio(L) and pi2(L) = r L − λ (I − L) + w = pio(L)




(I − L) and s2s = s2l = w
where H∗∗ is the solution to:
w +
r H∗∗
1− p = (I − L)
(
r + λ
) − λφL (14)
Regime 2 only occurs if bankruptcy costs are strictly positive (i.e. H∗∗ < H∗ ⇐⇒
φ > 0).
Regime 2 arises for intermediate levels of human capital (i.e. if H∗∗ ≤ H < H∗).
The optimal debt policy for all firms is to adopt a debt level Ds = Dl = L. By
constraining the debt level to L, managers’ investment in human capital has a strictly
positive NPV (i.e. M s = M l > W + H). Bankruptcy costs make it, however, not
optimal to raise debt levels. Equityholders break even in booms and recessions. Since
D = L, equity has a zero (or arbitrarily small) value in recessions. Managers’ salary
rate exceeds the efficient compensation rate during booms, and equals the outside
wage rate during recessions. As higher bankruptcy costs are associated with a wider
range of parameter values for which region 2 prevails, wages on average increase with
bankruptcy costs.36 Equityholders payout rate equals the efficient rate at all times. The
36An increase of the average wage with bankruptcy costs occurs despite managers not bearing any
fraction of those costs.
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total profit rate in booms exceeds the first-best profit rate (pi > pio), which implies
that there is insufficient entry in booms (entry is insufficient as long as φ > 0). The
industry output level is, however, efficient in recessions.
Proposition 7 presents the solution for low levels of human capital (i.e. H < H∗∗).
Proposition 7 If H < H∗∗ then we observe ‘regime 3’ in which some firms adopt a
high debt level and some firms adopt a lower debt level. The former firms leave the
industry in recession. The debt value exceeds L for all firms. The debt, profits and
managerial compensation are given by:
D3l(L) = I +
λ
r





1− p = L +
(H∗∗ −H)













(r + 2λ)(1− p)
pi3(L) = r I + λ (I − L) + λφL + w + r H
1− p > pi
o(L)
pi3(L) = r D3s − λ (I − D3s) + s3s = pio(L) +
r2(H∗∗ −H)(r + λ+ λ)
(r + 2λ)(1− p)(r + λ) −
λλφL
r + λ
s3l = w +
r H







1− p + λ (I − L(1− φ))
]
> s3l
s3s(L) = w −
λ
r + λ




(r + 2λ)(1− p) + φL
]
Proposition 7 states that if the required investment in human capital is low (i.e
H < H∗∗) then all firms adopt a debt level that exceeds L in order to constrain
managers in booms. Furthermore, firms that leave in recession adopt a higher debt
level than survivors. High leverage prevents managers from capturing excess rents in
booms, but causes these firms to incur bankruptcy costs in recession. Survivors, on
the other hand, set their debt level sufficiently low so that in recession equityholders
and managers are indifferent between staying and leaving. By doing so these firms are
able to issue risk-free debt. However, by constraining the debt level, managers of these
firms get excess rents in booms (i.e. s3s > s3l).
37 These excess rents are partially
37The tradeoff between bankruptcy costs and managerial rent capture induces heterogeneity in
capital structure in a similar fashion as in Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), where firms trade off the
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clawed back in recession when managers of the surviving firms get paid below their
reservation wage. Managers are willing to accept this cut because of the prospect of
superior rents in future booms.38 While managers of firms that leave in recession break
even in booms and recessions, managers of firms that stay have a positive NPV claim
in booms (i.e. M3s > W + H). This means that there is a first-mover advantage for
managers that enter first into the industry and it explains why these managers do not
leave in recession, despite being paid below the reservation wage. First movers have
an interest to adopt a low debt level because by doing so these firms capture upon
investment a positive NPV equal to:
E3s + M3s + D3s − I − W − H = M3s − W − H > 0
Even though equityholders of all firms only break even, the market capitalization of
first movers is larger (i.e. E3s = I − D3s > E3l = I − B3l since B3l > D3s).
Undercollateralized debt leads to inefficiencies because it brings with it bankruptcy
costs and debt overhang. The highly levered firms anticipate future bankruptcy costs
and therefore require a higher equilibrium profit rate in booms to compensate. This cre-
ates underinvestment in booms39. Firms that plan to stay in recession constrain their
debt level such that both managers’ and equityholders’ outside option exactly binds in
recession. This lower debt level gives managers excess rents in booms (s3s > s3l = w).
These excess rents increase with bankruptcy costs and allow managers’ compensation
to be cut in recession below the reservation wage by an amount λ
r+λ
(s3s − s3l). This
provides space for profits to be reduced in recession by an equal amount. Bankruptcy
costs therefore create an overinvestment effect in recession. On the other hand, the
tax advantage of debt against the agency costs of debt. In equilibrium, some firms issue low amounts
of debt, forgoing debt-related tax shields but committing to the subsequent choice of the less risky
project with higher pre-tax cash flows, whereas other firms adopt more debt, capturing large benefits
but creating incentives to choose subsequently the riskier project.
38For example, during the recent crisis GM’s CEO at the time, Rick Wagoner, and his counterpart
at Ford, Alan Mulally, offered to accept salaries of $1 conditional on the implementation of the US
federal government bailout plan, cf. ”High price of a government lifeline to US carmakers”, Financial
Times, 12 Dec 2008.
39Debt overhang also leads to underinvestment in Brander and Spencer (1989), Dasgupta and
Sengupta (1993), and Hennessy and Livdan (2009).
33
profit rate pi3 increases to the extent that D exceeds L. Since equityholders have limited
liability, undercollateralized debt leads to the well known Myers (1977) underinvest-
ment effect. To summarize, for values of H just below H∗∗ the bankruptcy cost effect
dominates, resulting in overinvestment (i.e. insufficient exit) during recession, whereas
for lower levels of H the debt level adopted is much higher and this causes the debt
overhang effect to dominate in recession (i.e. too much exit).
Regime 3 is derived under the assumption that some firms leave in recession. How-
ever, as φ increases the equilibrium profit rate in booms (recessions) unambiguously
rises (falls) (see Proposition 7). Consequently, the industry output in booms (reces-
sions) monotonically falls (rises) as φ increases. There exists therefore a level φ∗ for
which Q equals Q, and firms no longer leave the market40: bankruptcy costs lower
the firm’s liquidation value and, as such, lead to more hysteresis. For sufficiently high
levels of bankruptcy costs industry output therefore remains constant. Typical values
for φ∗ are, however, unrealistically high from an economic viewpoint.41 We therefore
do not discuss the case φ > φ∗.42
[Please insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 illustrates and summarizes the paper’s main results.43 Panel A illustrates
the negative relation between the debt principal, D, and the (sunk) cost of human
40One can show that Q(H) − Q(H) is minimized at H∗∗. Therefore a sufficient and neces-
sary condition for no exit to occur for some H (under assumption 2) is that φ > φ∗, where φ∗
is the root of Q(H∗∗(φ∗)) = Q(H∗∗(φ∗)), or equivalently the root of pi−1 [pi3(I, L,H∗∗(φ∗))] =
pi−1 [pi3(I, L,H
∗∗(φ∗))]. A value for φ∗ always exists, but is not necessarily bounded by 1. Further-
more, H∗∗ can be negative. As a result, a no-exit region does not always exist for the set of parameter
values that are economically relevant.
41Remember that I − L captures the loss with respect to intangible assets. Therefore 1 − φ is the
recovery rate on the tangible assets, L. For the parameter values used in Figure 2, φ∗ equals 0.463 ,
which is way above the degree of bankruptcy costs that would apply on tangible assets.
42A full analysis of the case φ > φ∗ is available from the authors upon request.
43The figure is generated using the following demand functions and parameter values. pi(Q) =
p(Q) = aQ− − b and pi(Q) = p(Q) = aQ− − b, where a = 200 and a = 25, b = b = 1 and
 = 1.1. Furthermore, λ = λ = 0.075, r = 0.05, I = 200, L = 150, w = 2, w = 1 and φ = 0.1.
34
capital investment, H. The debt principal is not a strictly decreasing function of H.
The flat segment is due to the presence of bankruptcy costs. For H falling into the
interval [H∗∗, H∗[= [39.06, 53.12[ firms adopt in equilibrium the second-best level of
debt equal to L. Such a policy allows shareholders to avoid bankruptcy costs but is
associated with excess rents for managers. For H < H∗∗ = 39.06 the benefit of con-
straining managers dominates the expected bankruptcy costs: firms adopt risky debt
that increases expected bankruptcy costs but allows for concessions from managers.
Figure 2 confirms that for H < H∗∗ firms that are expected to leave the industry in
recession (i.e. the second movers) adopt a risky debt level (D > L) that is substantially
higher than their surviving counterparts (i.e. the first movers).
The NDR, is depicted in Panel B.44 In booms, the NDR (as a function of the cost
of human capital investment) follows closely the relation between the optimal debt
principal and H. The (market value) NDR differs across firms in the region in which
risky debt is issued because the leavers adopt a higher debt level and incur bankruptcy
costs upon exit. In recessions, survivors can have a zero equity value, which means that
equityholders inject cash to keep the firm going.45 The amount of cash equityholders
are required to inject is such that they are exactly indifferent between staying or leaving.
For highly human capital intensive firms the NDR becomes negative. As mentioned
before, negative NDRs are a frequent occurrence in practice (see Bates et al., 2009).
Panel C plots the equilibrium profit rate. While the profit rate is (weakly) increasing
with H in booms, this is not everywhere the case in recessions because the profit rate
pi decreases with H in regime 3. The implications for industry output are illustrated in
Panel D. For H ≥ H∗ = 53.12 industry output is at the first-best level. In the absence
of frictions debt is set optimally to equalize the rents of shareholders and managers.
For levels of human capital investment where shareholders constrain the debt to be risk
free (i.e. for H ∈ [H∗∗, H∗[ = [39.06, 53.12[), there is insufficient entry in booms but
the efficient level of output in recessions. The underinvestment results from the fact
that in booms managers extract a surplus due to the the level of debt being capped at
L. As such, it is more severe when asset tangibility is lower. For low levels of human
capital investment (i.e for H < H∗∗) we observe underinvestment in booms because
44The market value NDR is defined as B/V for D ≥ 0 and D/(V −D) otherwise (cf. section 2).
45Note that NDRl = NDR = 1 if H = w = w = 0 (see also section 2).
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firms adopt a risky debt level that leads to debt overhang and deadweight costs of
bankruptcy. The magnitude of underinvestment increases with the bankruptcy cost
parameter, φ. In recessions we observe over or underinvestment depending on whether
bankruptcy costs or debt overhang costs dominate.46 Notice the jump in Q at H∗∗
where the switch from risky to safe debt occurs. At this point overinvestment in
recessions can be substantial even for modest levels of bankruptcy costs.
Panel E shows that the managerial compensation rate (weakly) increases as a func-
tion of H and is equal to the fair rate of return on human capital investment as long
as H ≥ H∗. For H ∈ [H∗∗, H∗[ managers receive excess rents in booms. For H < H∗∗,
managers are paid below the reservation wage w in recession. The model predicts that
for industries with very low human capital intensity (eg. steel industry) managerial
compensation could become negative in recession. This does not imply that the wealth
constrained managers are actually injecting cash in the firm out of their own pockets.
Rather it means that the providers of human capital make concessions on existing ar-
rangements regarding job security, employer pension contributions, holidays or social
security.47 However, surviving managers are on average still better off because they
enjoy large excess rents in booms. As regimes 2 and 3 correspond to I and I − L
being relatively large, we obtain that higher wages are associated, respectively, with
more capital-intensive industries and higher investment irreversibility, for a given level
of human capital investment.48 Finally, panel F plots the payout rate in booms and
recessions. A high debt level (corresponding to low values of H) can lead to a negative
payout. Equityholders are willing to inject cash into the firm because of the possibility
of an economic recovery. During booms the payout rate (weakly) increases in H and
is identical to managerial compensation (as ex-coupon cash flows are equally split be-
46Note that if bankruptcy costs are zero, underinvestment in recessions still occurs.
47A notable example in the current recession is the practice of freezing defined benefit pension
schemes to existing members. “Negative rents” can also be interpreted as managers contributing
“sweat equity” (see Lambrecht and Myers (2008) for further discussion).
48The positive relationship between the physical capital intensity and wages is also present in Berk
et al. (2010). Their result is due to the fact that capital-intensive firms can have more debt, which is
positively associated with the contracted wage. In our model, physical capital-intensive firms do not
take sufficient debt, which leaves surplus to managers.
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tween shareholders and managers). In recessions the payout rate is decreasing in the
region in which leavers adopt risky debt (i.e., for H < H∗∗) because of falling prof-
its. A higher investment in human capital requires (all else equal) higher equilibrium
profits and a lower debt level, both of which increase the free cash flows available for
distribution during booms.
5 Empirical Implications
The paper (and Propositions 5-7 in particular) provide a number of testable empirical
hypotheses.
H1: Firms within a given industry have a net debt target D that is a linear function
of 4 variables: physical capital (I), investment in human capital (H), the opportunity
cost of human capital (w) and the value of the firm’s physical capital upon closure (L):
D = (β1 + γ1S) I + (β2 + γ2S)H + (β3 + γ3S)w + (β4 + γ4S)L (15)
where S = 1 for old firms (first movers or ”survivors”)
S = 0 for young firms (second movers or ”leavers”)
Our model predicts a net debt target. This is a new hypothesis that has not yet
been tested in the literature. The regression coefficients are non-linear functions of the
macro-economic factors: the risk-free rate of interest, and the hazard of booms and
recessions (see Propositions 5, 6 and 7). The coefficients can vary according to whether
the firm is “old” (S = 1) or “young” (S = 0). The former corresponds to first movers
that survive recessions, whereas the latter relates to second movers that are expected
to leave in recession.49 Our predictions regarding the heterogeneity of capital structure
49To control for industry effects one can run the model on firms within a given industry. For
example, Propositions 5 to 7 show that the regressions coefficients vary according to the level of
human capital intensity (corresponding to regimes 1, 2 or 3). While firms within a given industry are
likely to fall within the same regime because they have similar levels of human capital intensity, this
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are consistent with MacKay and Philips (2005) who find that entrants have a higher
financial leverage ratio compared to incumbents, and that ’leavers’ exit their industry
much more leveraged than surviving incumbents. The theoretical result that ex-ante
identical firms can adopt different capital structures may help explain the persistent
heterogeneity in firms’ capital structures documented in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender
(2008).
By scaling all variables in (15) by total assets we obtain a regression model with the
net leverage as dependent variable.50 The corresponding independent variables are now
physical capital intensity, two complementary measures of human capital intensity, and
tangibility.51 Since liquid assets are netted out against debt liabilities, net leverage is
no longer bounded by zero, but can actually get negative. Net leverage contains more
information than the traditional leverage ratio that is left-censored at zero.
H2: Net leverage is positively related to physical capital intensity but net leverage of
industry survivors is less sensitive to physical capital intensity than net leverage of
industry leavers (β1 + γ1 > 0 but γ1 ≤ 0). Net leverage is negatively related to human
capital intensity variables but net leverage of industry survivors is less sensitive to
human capital intensity variables than net leverage of industry leavers (β2 + γ2 < 0
and β3 + γ3 < 0 but γ2, γ3 ≥ 0).
Our model predicts that net leverage increases with physical capital intensity and
decreases with human capital intensity. These predictions are broadly supported by
the existing empirical literature. Controlling for a fairly comprehensive list of tradi-
tional capital structure determinants, Qian (2003) finds a negative relation between
financial leverage and human capital. She shows that human capital intensity has ex-
planatory power in addition to the collateral value of firm assets and the firm’s growth
is less likely to be the case for firms that come from different industries (say a biotech firm versus a
steel manufacturer).
50Ideally, we want to scale by the market value of total assets, but this variable is not observable.
One possible proxy is to use the sum of the firm’s stock market capitalization, its debt and the value
of all outstanding claims by managers (such as stock options, pension rights etc).




H3: The relation between net leverage and tangibility is negative (positive) if a dollar
of extra debt leads to a low or zero (high) marginal increase in expected bankruptcy
costs. In particular, the relation is negative, i.e. β4 < 0 (positive, i.e. β4 > 0) for high
(intermediate) levels of human capital intensity, with γ4 = 0. For low levels of human
capital intensity, the relation is positive, i.e. β4 + γ4 > 0 (negative, i.e. β4 < 0) for
survivors (leavers), and therefore γ4 > 0. Furthermore, the relation is weaker if the
expected bankruptcy costs are higher.
The hypothesis with respect to tangibility is new and might help explain some
conflicting results in the literature regarding the effect of tangibility. We know that
debt is overcollaterized for firms that are relatively more human capital intensive.
Default is therefore not an issue, and higher tangibility means that equityholders get
more of their capital investment back upon closure and, as a result, are willing to accept
a lower debt level. Tangibility and leverage are therefore negatively related when debt is
overcollateralized. When firms are relatively more physical capital intensive then they
wish to adopt undercollateralized debt. Bankruptcy costs may, however, discourage
firms from adopting a debt level as high as they would wish, causing tangibility to be
positively related to leverage: higher tangibility means more collateral and allows firms
to issue more debt without increasing expected bankruptcy costs. A positive coefficient
for tangibility is therefore indirect evidence that the firm is constraining debt because
of bankruptcy cost considerations. Note that tangibility and leverage are negatively
related for highly physical capital intensive firms that are sure to go bankrupt in
recession, because an extra dollar of debt does not alter the default probability and
expected bankruptcy costs.
H4: Firms with negative debt are expected to have higher human capital intensity than
firms with a positive net leverage ratio.
Bates et al. (2009) report that the average (median) NDR for US firms has fallen
from 16.5% (17.8%) in 1980 to -1.5% (-0.3%) in 2004. The negative trend is pretty
much monotonic over time. The paper finds a substantial rise in cash holdings that
is linked to an increasing trend in R&D and a decline in firms’ net working capital
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(particularly inventories) and capital expenditures. The authors conclude that their
findings are “consistent with an explanation for the change in cash holdings that relies
on the precautionary motive and on changes in firm characteristics which affect the
demand for cash by firms”. Our model suggests another possible hypothesis that could
be explored, namely that over the past decades firms have become more reliant on
transferable human capital and less on physical capital. This fundamental change in
the nature of the firm has been reflected in firms’ capital structure.
H5: Higher sunk costs of physical and human capital (I − L and H) reduce output
volatility but increase profit volatility.
Our model predicts that higher sunk costs are associated with lower inertia, which
translates into fewer firms leaving the industry in recessions. As a consequence, the
industry output fluctuates less in the presence of higher sunk costs (recall that each
firm’s output is constant) and economic shocks are primarily absorbed by the output
price leading to higher profit volatility (cf. Novy-Marx, 2011).
The effect of sunk costs on profit volatility feeds through into the volatility of
dividend payout and managerial compensation, as highlighted in the following two
hypotheses.
H6: Managerial compensation and dividend payout are procyclical. The volatility of
managerial compensation is positively related with human capital intensity. The volatil-
ity of payout decreases with asset tangibility.
Managers get paid more in booms than in recession. The variation in pay across the
business cycle is of the order rH
1−p , which is a risk premium to compensate managers for
their sunk investment in human capital.52 The volatility in managerial pay is therefore
higher in human capital intensive industries. Furthermore, the shorter booms and
the longer recessions are expected to last, the larger this risk premium to compensate
managers for the fact that they may be laid off during recession.
Our results imply that managerial compensation should increase when investment in
52Proposition 7 demonstrates that bankruptcy costs can introduce additional volatility in pay for
firms with low human capital intensity. Compared to the term rH1−p this is, however, a second order
determinant of managerial compensation as was illustrated in Figure 2.
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general, transferable skills become more important, which is supported by the empirical
findings of Frydman and Saks (2010) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007). Abdel-Khalik
(2003) finds that human capital factors are a significant determinant of the ratio of
performance-based compensation to base salary. This ratio ranges from 2.85 for public
utilities to 10.34 for computer and information technology. Financial institutions and
health care are next in rank to computer and IT.
Our model implies that dividend payout is procyclical. The variation in payout
across the business cycle is of the order
(
r + λ+ λ
)
(I − L). As a result, firms with
more tangible assets have a more stable payout. Shorter business cycles (high λ and
λ) further increase payout variation.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a theory of net debt that is based on important differences between
physical capital and transferable human capital. While the firm owns the physical
capital, it has no property rights over human capital. Transferable human capital can
at any time leave to join another firm, making it impossible for firms to issue tradeable
claims directly against transferable human capital. Consequently, it is managers who
have to bear the cost of investing in transferable human capital. It is this asymmetry
between physical capital and transferable human capital that can cause net debt to
be negative in our model. Managers only invest in human capital if they expect to
be compensated ex post. In human capital intensive industries equityholders therefore
contribute a net surplus of liquid assets that throw off rents to be shared with the
managers. If managers finance their investment in human capital (e.g. education) by
personal debt (instead of savings) then these rents serve to pay off the managers’ debt.
Negative net corporate debt therefore indirectly creates space for personal debt taken
on by the firm’s managers or employees. While the firm cannot borrow against human
capital, its managers or employees can take out personal debt against the future rents
produced by its human capital. Transferable human capital is financed by the manager
and not by the firm in order to overcome a hold-up problem: if a manager withdraws
her human capital from the firm, then any financial liabilities associated with this key
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asset also leave the firm.
The paper provides a series of novel empirical hypotheses that are listed in the
previous section. Our proposed linear regression model for the firm’s net debt target
could form the basis of an empirical study. While the empirical model itself is simple,
the main challenge for empiricists will be to construct suitable proxies for the human
capital related variables. We refer to Qian (2003) for examples of possible proxies.
There are also theoretical extensions that remain to be explored. While financ-
ing policy is allowed to vary across firms, we hold investment and production policy
constant, ignoring the effect of growth options or heterogeneity of productivity. The
paper also assumes that investment in human capital can be financed efficiently. Credit
rationing or frictions in the market for personal debt could lead to underinvestment in
human capital and have effects on the industry equilibrium. Finally, the paper does not
consider managers’ incentives to exert effort. These incentives are particularly relevant
for managers that leave the industry in recession.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Under risk neutrality the claim value δ must satisfy the following relationship: rδ = λ
[
1− δ].
Solving gives the expression for δ. The value Π of a claim that pays pi for as long as the
current boom lasts must satisfy the following equation: rΠ = pi + λ
[




In booms (recession) the value V (V ) of a perpetual claim that pays pi during booms and pi
during recessions satisfies: rV = pi + λ
[
V − V ] and rV = pi + λ [V − V ]. Solving this
system of 2 equations gives the expressions for V and V .
Proof of Proposition 3
The present value of all cash flows generated (in perpetuity) by an owner-manager who
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1 − δδ − H (16)
where Q denotes the industry output during booms and where δ = λ
r+λ
and δ = λr+λ are
discount factors previously defined in Proposition 2. The above expression sums up the cash
flows over all future business cycles. The factor δδ is the discount factor that applies to one
business cycle (i.e. it is the value of a claim that pays 1 dollar as soon as the economy has
switched state twice).
Entry is preferable to no entry if PV ≥ W . In a market with competitive entry, firms
break even in equilibrium, that is, PV − W = 0. Solving the break-even condition for pi
yields the equilibrium profits in booms:
pi(Q) = r I + λ (I − L) + w + r H
1− p (17)
We know that in competitive equilibrium the value V l of a firm that leaves in recession is
given by V l =
pi
r+λ
+ δV l = I +W +H. Solving for V l gives:
V l = L + W + δ H (18)
The equilibrium profits in recession are determined by the industry output during recessions
(Q). If some exit is optimal when the industry switches from a boom to a recession (Q > Q),
then firms keep leaving the market till, in equilibrium, their owners are indifferent between
staying in the market and leaving. On the other hand, it could be that no firms leave the
market (Q = Q). This would happen if at the existing output level Q all firms were strictly
better off staying than leaving.
Consider the relevant case where some firms leave the market (Q > Q). Assuming we
are in a recession, then the present value, V s, of all profits generated by staying forever in a








When the economy switches from a boom to a recession, firms keep leaving the industry up
to the point where they become indifferent between staying or leaving, i.e.:
V s(Q,Q) = V l(Q,Q) = L + W + δ H (20)
Combining the above two equations allows to solve for pi(Q):
pi(Q) = r L − λ (I − L) + w (21)
For given profit functions pi(Q) and pi(Q), the above equilibrium conditions yield Q and Q.
One can verify that V s = I + W + H.
Now, consider what would happen if it was optimal for no firm to leave during reces-
sions. Competitive entry implies that the value V s obtained from entry equals the sum of all
investment costs (I, H) and opportunity costs (W ):
V s(Q˜, Q˜) =
pi(Q˜)
r
(1− p) + pi(Q˜)
r
p = I + H + W (22)
This condition pins down Q˜, the industry output that prevails conditional on the industry
output to remain constant across booms and recessions (i.e. under no exit).
We now want to determine a necessary and sufficient condition for exit to occur, i.e.
Q > Q. Since the profit functions are continuous and monotonically decreasing in output,
there exists a transition boundary where we shift from a regime with some exit (Q > Q) to
a regime with no exit (Q = Q). At that boundary there is room for one atomistic firm to
be indifferent between staying or leaving the industry. For this atomistic firm the value (in
recession) of staying in the industry forever is given by:
V s(Q˜, Q˜) =
pi(Q˜)
r
(1− p) + pi(Q˜)
r
p (23)
On the other hand, if this atomistic firm leaves the industry then its value was shown to be
given by:
V l(Q,Q) = L + W + δH (24)
Since it concerns one infinitesimally small atomistic firm this implies that Q ≈ Q ≈ Q˜. Using
a continuity argument it follows that at the transition boundary it must be the case that:
V s(Q˜, Q˜) =
pi(Q˜)
r
(1− p) + pi(Q˜)
r
p = L + W + δH = V l(Q,Q) (25)
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Consequently,






1− p − p) = I − L + (W + H − W − δH)
(26)
After rearranging and simplifying, we obtain:
pi(Q˜) − pi(Q˜) = (I − L) (r + λ + λ) + w + r H
1− p − w ≡ ∆(I, L,H) (27)
Given that pi(Q) and pi(Q) are continuous and monotonically decreasing in Q, it follows that
a necessary and sufficient condition for exit to occur is given by pi(Q˜) − pi(Q˜) > ∆(I, L,H)
where Q˜ is the solution to V s(Q˜, Q˜) = I + W + H.
Proof of Proposition 4
It follows immediately from equityholders’ limited liability that their payoff from leaving
the firm in recession is given by oe = (L − D)+. The value of managers’ outside option
in recession equals the maximum value of two possible strategies. A first strategy is that
managers leave the industry in recessions but return in booms. A second strategy is for
managers to stay out of the industry in both booms and recessions. This latter strategy
results in a lower bound for the value of the managers’ outside option given by om =
W = wr (1 − p) + wr p. Under the former strategy, the value of the outside option equals:
om =
w
r (1− p) + slr p, where sl is managers’ salary rate in booms, conditional on managers
leaving in recessions. We know from result 1 that sl =
pi− r Dl
2 . The profit level pi is
determined by the boundary condition El = I − Bl, which reflects the fact that the market








+ δ [ξL(1− φ) + (1− ξ)Dl] (29)
where ξ = 1 if Dl > L and ξ = 0 otherwise. Therefore:
El + Bl =
pi + r Dl + 2λL(1− φξ)
2(r + λ)
(30)




= El +Bl − I is monotonically increasing in Dl, except
at Dl = L where there is a discrete downward jump because of the deadweight bankruptcy
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costs φL. Solving (i) sl =
pi−rDl









I − 2λ(1− φξ)L − rDl
Substituting the expression for sl into om gives the expression for om.
To see that it is never optimal for a manager not to return to a firm in a boom (and
to receive outside wage w only), one needs to verify that in equilibrium sl(Dl) > w. The
equilibrium value for Dl is given in Propositions 5-7 according to the 3 regimes that can arise.
Consider regime 1 first (see Proposition 5). Substituting the value for D1l into sl(Dl) gives:




1− p = s1l > w (32)
Similarly, one can verify that sl(D2l) = s2l > w and sl(D3l) = s3l > w.
Proof of Propositions 5, 6 and 7
We assume that it is optimal for some firms to leave in recession (i.e. Q > Q) and
subsequently derive the condition under which this assumption is indeed valid. We derive
first the policies and claim values for firms that exit in recessions, and subsequently derive
the solution for firms that remain in the industry at all times. We derive the proof assuming
that equityholders set the debt policy, but show that equityholders’ participation constraint
is always binding in a competitive equity market and that managers’ (equityholders’) claim
decreases (increases) in the debt level. As a result it is not possible for managers to raise the
debt level any further without violating equityholders’ participation constraint. The same
debt level is therefore also constrained optimal from managers’ viewpoint.
I. Policies and claim values for firms that exit in recession







s.t. M l ≥ W + H. We know from equation (30) that:
El + Bl =
pi + r D + 2λL(1− φξ)
2(r + λ)
where ξ = 1 if D > L and zero otherwise
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Equityholders’ payoff El + Bl − I is monotonically increasing in D, except at D = L where
there is a discrete downward jump because of the deadweight bankruptcy costs φL. It follows
that it can only be optimal to adopt risky debt (D > L) rather than constrain the debt to
the maximum safe debt level (D = L) if and only if:
pi + r D + 2λL(1− φ)
2(r + λ)
>
pi + r L + 2λL
2(r + λ)
⇐⇒ D > L + 2λLφ
r
(33)
Managers’ participation constraint requires that:
M l =
(pi − r Dl)
2r
(1− p) + w
r







To identify the maximum debt principal that can be issued, we first need to solve for pi. With
competitive entry pi is the solution to El = I − Bl, and is given by:
pi = 2
[
r I + λ (I − L) + φλLξ] − r D (35)
Substituting (35) into (34), we find that the maximum debt level that satisfies managers’
participation constraint equals:
r Dl = rI + λ (I − L) + λφLξ − w − rH
1− p (36)
Using (33) and (36) it follows that equityholders choose risky debt if and only if:
r Dl = rI + λ (I − L) + λφL − w − rH
1− p > r L + 2λφL (37)
⇐⇒ (r + λ) (I − L) − λφL > w + r H
1− p ⇐⇒ H < H
∗∗ (38)




(I − L) − λφL = w + r H∗∗1−p . It follows immediately that:





> L ⇐⇒ (I − L)(r + λ) > w + rH
1− p (39)
which is satisfied since by assumption H < H∗∗.
Consider next the case where the optimal debt level is safe (Dl < L). From (36) (with ξ = 0)
it follows that:
r Dl = rI + λ (I − L) − w − rH
1− p < r L
⇐⇒ (r + λ)(I − L) < w + rH
1− p ⇐⇒ H > H
∗ (40)
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where H∗ is defined as:(r + λ)(I − L) = w + r H∗1−p . Therefore, Dl < L is optimal for
H∗ < H. The equilibrium profit rate for H > H∗ can be found by substituting back the




We know that Dl > L for H < H
∗∗ and that Dl < L for H > H∗. What is the optimal
debt level for the intermediate interval [H∗∗, H∗]? Since H > H∗∗, it follows that Dl ≤ L
(cf. (40)). Therefore L is the highest debt level that equityholders wish to adopt. Managers’
participation constraint requires that M l ≥ W + H or, equivalently (cf. (34) for D = L):






rI + λ(I − L)] − rL − 2 [w + rH1−p] (41)
⇐⇒ w + rH1−p ≤ (r + λ)(I − L) ⇐⇒ H ≤ H∗ (42)
which is satisfied since H ∈ [H∗∗, H∗]. Consequently, for H ∈ [H∗∗, H∗[ the managers’
participation constraint does not bind, i.e. M l > W + H (as (42) is a strict inequality in
this case).
Regime 2 arises if the interval [H∗∗, H∗[ is not empty, i.e. H∗∗ < H∗. Since r(H
∗−H∗∗)
1−p =
λφL, it follows that regime 2 only occurs if φ > 0.
II. Policies and claim values for firms that do not exit in recession
Since the debt of “stayers” is risk-free, it follows that Bs = Bs = Ds. The claim values
for firms that do not exit are given by:
Es =
pi− ss
r (1− p) + pi− ssr p − Ds M s = ssr (1− p) + ssr p
Es =
pi− ss
r (1− p) + pi−ssr p − Ds M s = ssr (1− p) + ssr p
In a competitive equilibrium with exit, the outside options of both equityholders and man-
agers bind in recession, and therefore Es = oe and M s = om. We first derive explicit
expressions for om. Substituting the solution for Dl into the expression for om (see Proposi-
tion 4) and using the fact that ξ = 0 for regimes 1 and 2 (H∗∗ ≤ H) and ξ = 1 for regime
3 (H < H∗∗) gives (recall that the manager that decides to leave during a recession would
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return to a “leaver” during a boom):
om =
w









r (1− p) +
((r+λ)(I−L))
r p = M l > W + δ H for H
∗∗ ≤ H < H∗
om =
w





r p = W + δ H = M l for H < H
∗∗
Note that M s = M l and, in equilibrium, firms are therefore indifferent between leaving or
staying.







s.t. M s = om and M s ≥ W + H
Consider first the effect of an increase in Ds on managers’ participation constraint. We know












Substituting (43) into the expression for M s gives: M s =
pi−rDs
2(r+λ)
+ δM l. Note that M l
is determined by sl and w, which are unaffected by the behavior of firms that do not exit
(since sl =
pi− rDl
2 is determined by the marginal entrant that leaves the market during
recessions). Consequently, equityholders of firms that do not exit affect M s only through Ds,
and ∂Ms∂Ds < 0. Increasing Ds unambiguously lowers managers’ claim, and the participation
constraint therefore puts a cap on Ds.
Consider next the effect of an increase inDs on the equityholders’ payoff. Using the bargaining
solution for ss we get:
Es + Ds =
pi
r
(1− p) − (pi − rDs)
2r
(1− p) + (pi − ss)
r
p (44)





2(1−p) . Substituting into the equityholders’ payoff func-
tion it follows that:
∂[Es+Ds− I]
∂Ds
> 0. It follows that raising Ds unambiguously increases
equityholders’ payoff. Equityholders therefore want to adopt the highest debt level that sat-
isfies managers’ participation constraint. The equilibrium condition requires that M s = M l,
which ensures that managers do not have an incentive to leave in recession. It remains to be
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shown that also M s ≥ W + H. As M s = ssr+λ + δM s and M s = M l ≥ W + δH, a





W + H − δW − δδH] ⇐⇒ ss ≥ w + r H
1− p (45)
We can subsequently verify that the equilibrium solution indeed satisfies this condition.
The equilibrium solution for pi, ss, ss and Ds can now be derived as the solution to the
system of equations: (i) Es = oe (ii) M s = om (iii) ss =
pi−rDs
2 and (iv) Es = I − Ds.
Condition (iv) reflects the fact that outside equity is supplied on a competitive basis.
Substituting the previously derived expressions for pi and om into the system of equations,
and solving, gives the expressions for pi, ss, ss and Ds as in Propositions 5, 6 and 7. One
can immediately verify that M s ≥ M l ≥ W + H, and therefore managers’ participation
constraint is satisfied.
We now need to verify whether Q > Q as originally assumed. In regime 1, the solution
for pi and pi coincides with the first-best outcome given in Proposition 3. From assumption 2 it
follows then immediately that Q > Q. In regime 2, pi and pi are independent of H, and hence
Q and Q are constant, and therefore so is Q − Q. In regime 3, ∂pi∂H > 0 and ∂pi∂H < 0, which
means that
∂[Q−Q]
∂H < 0. Furthermore, one can show that pi (and therefore Q) is continuous
at H∗∗, whereas pi (Q) displays a discrete downward (upward) jump at H∗∗ if φ > 0. It
follows that if some firms leave in recession for H = H∗∗ (i.e. if Q(H∗∗) > Q(H∗∗)) then exit
occurs for all values of H that satisfy assumption 2, and a sufficient and necessary condition
for exit to occur is therefore that Q(H∗∗) > Q(H∗∗). Substituting the expression for H∗∗
into pi and pi gives:




(I − L) (46)
pi(H∗∗) = r L − λ (I − L) + w − λλφL
r + λ
(47)











This condition is satisfied for φ = 0 since in that case H∗∗ = H∗ and we previously showed
that exit occurs at H∗. However, since ∂Q(H
∗∗)
∂φ > 0, it follows that for φ sufficiently
large there will be a crossing point where Q = Q. Define φ∗ as the root of the equation
Q(H∗∗(φ∗)) = Q(H∗∗(φ∗)). If φ < φ∗ then the exit condition is everywhere satisfied. If
φ ≥ φ∗ then the exit condition is violated at H∗∗. Therefore, if φ > φ∗ then there exists a
region for which no firms leave the market.
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Figure 1: Industry dynamics. V and V denote the firm value in booms and recessions,
respectively, I is the physical investment cost, L is the liquidation value, w and w (pi(Q)
and pi(Q)) represent outside wages (profits) in booms and recessions, respectively, and
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Figure 2: Comparative statics results for debt principal, net debt ratio, total profit,
industry output, managerial compensation and payout to shareholders generated for
the following parameter values: pi(Q) = aQ− − b and pi(Q) = aQ− − b, where
a = 200 and a = 25, b = b = 1 and  = 1.1. Furthermore, λ = λ = 0.075,
r = 0.05, I = 200, L = 150, w = 2, w = 1, and φ = 0.1.
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